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RECENT DECISIONS
laterally attacking a foreign divorce decree in a civil or criminal
proceeding initiated by it where both parties have appeared."
E. V. W., JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS AND RE-
LIGION-EXcLUSION BY PROPERTY OWNER.-Plaintiffs, members of
the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, endeavor to interest people in their
tenets by means of leaflets which they distribute, either on the streets
or from door to door. They also disseminate their doctrines orally
or with the aid of portable phonographs. The defendant, the owner
of a housing project known as Parkchester, situated in the Bronx, in
New York City, pursuant to authority granted it in its leases with
its tenants, adopted a regulation prohibiting any person from enter-
ing any of its apartment buildings in order to solicit donations or con-
tributions to any religious or other organization or to distribute
pamphlets or tracts without the consent of the manager of the de-
velopment. Such activities were permitted in the apartment of any
tenant who gave his written consent. The plaintiffs attack this reg-
ulation as being an infringement upon their constitutional rights of
freedom of speech, of the press and of worship.1 The trial court
dismissed the complaint and held that the regulation was reasonable
and valid and not in violation of plaintiffs' rights. Held, dismissal
affirmed. The Bill of Rights does not proscribe the reasonable regu-
lation by an owner of conduct inside his multiple dwelling. Watch-
tower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 297 N. Y. 339, 79 N. E. 2d 433 (1948).
The plaintiffs contend fhat door-to-door preaching and distribu-
tion of bible literature is protected by the Constitution,2 and such
protection extends to multiple as well as single dwellings.3 There-
fore, argue the plaintiffs, this regulation is void, since it abridges
fundamental freedoms by expressly prohibiting such door-to-door
calls in Parkchester. In the cases cited by the plaintiffs to sustain
11 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in writing the majority opinion in the second
Williams case left the question, as to the right of a state to attack a foreign
divorce decree, rendered in a truly adversary proceeding, open. An answer
to that question was not necessary to the decision of the instant case, nor did
the court by way of dictum answer it, unless the holding that the Florida decree
is conclusive be deemed to preclude the state of Massachusetts as well as the
parties. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, by voicing a strong dissent on the ground
that the state should not be precluded, apparently felt that the question had
been answered.
2 U. S. CoNsr. AMENDS. I, XIV, § 1; NEW YORK Cosr~. Art. I, §§ 3, 8.
2 Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. ed.
1292 (1943) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 87 L. ed. 1313 (1943).
3Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 90 L. ed. 265 (1946);
Tucker v. State of Texas, 326 U. S. 517, 90 L. ed. 274 (1946); Hague v.
Comrpittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 83 L. ed. 1423 (1939).
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their proposition, there were attempts by local governmental author-
ities to suppress distribution of literature by members of Jehovah's
Witnesses in public places, and the various statutes or ordinances
were held a form of censorship. 4 The United States Supreme Court
has held invalid a ban on the issuance of literature in public places in
the companion cases of Marsh v. State of Alabama 5 and Tucker v.
State of Texas," and it reiterated the doctrine that the plaintiffs had a
right to distribute their literature upon the streets and to knock on
doors abutting the streets.7 But the real issue here has to do with the
fact that title to the sidewalks was not in a municipality, but in
others.8
In the instant case, the court, after analyzing the above cases,
declares that People v. Bohnke 9 is still law in New York; and that
it does not conflict with the United States Supreme Court, since its
prohibition is not on dissemination of information in public places,
but in private dwellings when there is objection on the part of the
owner to receiving such information.
That a person has a right to distribute religious literature in
public is now incontrovertible. But it is also equally clear from the
present case and from prior determinations, that the decision as to
whether or not one wishes to receive such literature in his household
rests primarily upon the homeowner, which, according to the Supreme
Court, is where it belongs. 10 The defendant's regulation in the pres-
ent case accomplishes just that result; and, notwithstanding attacks
made upon it, the time-honored maxim that a man's home is his
castle continues to remain inviolate.
L. E. M.
4 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143, 144, 87 L. ed. 1313,
1317 (1943). The court in holding a city ordinance invalid said, "The ordinance
does not control anything but the distribution of literature, and in that respect
it substitutes the judgment of the community for the judgment of the indi-
vidual householder."
5 Supra note 3.6 Supra note 3.
7 Martin v. City of Struthers, supra note 2; Jamison v. State of Texas,
318 U. S. 413, 87 L. ed. 869 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U. S.
444, 82 L. ed. 949 (1938).
8 The court determined the case on a previously enunciated doctrine that,
regardless of who has the title to streets or parks, they have always been con-
sidered as being held in trust for the use of the public.
9287 N. Y. 154, 38 N. E. 2d 478 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 667, 86
L. ed. 1743 (1942). Here, a village ordinance providing that, without the
consent of the occupant, no person could enter upon private residential prop-
erty for the purpose of distributing pamphlets, was held valid. The court said
that none of the appellants' rights were infringed upon since the ordinance
merely regulated their entry upon private property, and that the Constitution
did not guarantee them the right to go freely upon private property when the
householder objected.
10 Martin v. City of Struthers, supra note 2.
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